In a universal banking system, information advantages but also conflicts of interest may arise within a bank. We analyze the extent of these effects in a specific setting. Analysts in a bank's research department regularly issue reports on firms having no relationship to the bank as well as on firms where the bank has a strategic interest. Officially banks have to establish a so-called Chinese Wall around the research department to allow the analysts to work independently, and to avoid the flow of insiders' information. Using ownership data and analysts' earnings per share forecasts on German companies from 1994 to 1999, we test for both informational advantages and possible conflicts of interests. Our findings are consistent with banks having superior knowledge on firms where they own equity stakes.
I. Introduction
In contrast to the Anglo-American capital markets, banks in Germany are not restricted in their activities. They participate in loan and deposit markets as well an in the securities markets, where they act as brokers, dealers and hold long term equity stakes in non-financial firms.
Proponents of the concept of universal banking argue, that banks can now offer their clients an extensive range of financial services, which may result in a very intense bank-client relationship. This tight cooperation of a firm with a bank, the "Hausbank", may mitigate information asymmetries and prove to be mutually beneficial. The main drawback of a universal banking framework as it is implemented in Germany is, that conflicts of interest are more likely to arise between the different departments of the bank and their respective customers.
In this paper we want to examine the existence of conflicts of interest in a specific setting.
Analysts in the banks research department regularly issue reports on firms having no relationship to the bank as well as on firms which are customers of the banks or where the bank has a strategic interest (e.g. equity stake). Officially banks have to establish a Chinese Wall around the research department for two reasons. First to shield analysts and allow them to work independent, and second to ensure that analysts do not incorporate confidential insider information in their reports. While the second point is quite obvious, let us have a closer look at the first issue. Several groups might exert pressure to influence the analyst's report. Loan officers might be concerned to loose lending volume to rival banks after a downgrade in an analysts report, members of the investment banking division can fear the loss of future deals, and the bank itself might be afraid of its equity stakes loosing value.
In our paper we want to examine how well built these Chinese Walls are and in what direction information flows are more likely to occur. We therefore test whether housebanks' analysts publish biased recommendations, indicating that pressure is put on analysts, and we also explore, if the housebanks' analysts reports are more accurate than the reports from rival banks, which would be indicative of inside information.
There are two streams of literature related to our research. The first one examines a possible conflict of interest in analyst forecasts.
1 Michaely and Womack (1999) find that underwriter analyst recommendations for IPO firms are less accurate and positively biased. Dunbar, Hwang, and Shastri (1999) also support the hypothesis of conflict of interest for underwriters buy recommendations made shortly after the IPO. However, non-initial buy recommendations by underwriters lead to positive stock market reactions, indicating superior information of these analysts. Lin and McNichols (1998) show that analysts affiliated with investment banks underwriting a seasoned equity offering issue more favorable recommendations, while their forecast of subsequent earnings is not biased.
Most of these studies focus only on conflicts of interests within investment banks. The situation might be different for banks operating under an universal banking paradigm, which is examined in the second branch of literature related to our research. 2 Analyzing data from the pre-Glass-Steagall area when commercial banks as well as investment houses were allowed to engage in underwriting, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) show that bank underwritten securities performed better and defaulted less than investment bank underwritten issues. Puri (1996) and Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) find evidence that commercial banks could sell the issues they underwrote at a higher price, indicating a certification role for commercial banks.
3 Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Hamao and Hoshi (2000) and Klein and Zoeller (2001) examine the venture capital, the Japanese bond market and German IPOs, repectively. Using recent data they find that securities underwritten by bank affiliates are issued at a discount, possibly 1 Other studies examine forecast accurracy (Brown and Rozeff (1978) , Stickel (1992) ), analyst coverage (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (forthcoming) ), analyst herding and career concerns (Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) , Hong and Kubik (2001) , Welch (2000) ), the profitability of analysts' recommendations (Womack (1996) , Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) ), institutional ownership (Ackert and Athanassakos (2000) ), and biases in analyst forecasts due to over-and underreaction (Easterwood and Nutt (1999) ) or due to better access to firm management (Lim (2001) ). Some papers providing evidence on analyst behavior outside the U.S. are Chang, Kahanna, and Palepu (2000) , Bolliger (2001) , and Capstaff, Paudyal, and Rees (1998) 2 In most countries with universal banking, also the corporate governance structures differ substantially from the U.S. This is also the case in Germany. The majority of German publicly listed companies has a dominant shareholder, and banks exert substantial influence in the governance process, as reported by Franks and Mayer (2000) and Boehmer (1999) . Thus, close ties exist in two levels: first, through the heavy weight of banks in the governance structure, and second, because of the German housebank system.
3 Using data on bond issues in the UK, Hebb and Fraser (2001) finds no evidence of conflict of interest.
because of a conflict of interest. Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001) This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing analyst forecast ability in an environment with tight relationships between corporations and banks. Our main findings are consistent with an information advantage of banks which such a relationship. We also find evidence for a conflict of interest within banks owning equity stakes of up to 25 percent in the companies for which they make earnings forecasts. For these banks the main incentive for eventually suppressing bad news will generally come from client pressure. We do not find evidence for a conflict of interest within banks owning larger equity stakes, leading to the conclusion that a bank's self interest to increase the value of its equity stake is not an important factor influencing forecasts.
The rest of the paper is composed as follows: Section II derives the testable hypotheses, Section III describes the sample, the results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section IV, additional robustness checks are implemented in Section V and Section VI concludes.
II. Hypotheses
It is very hard to define a good measure for the intensity of bank relationships in Germany, since they are often of multiple nature. Firms borrow money from banks, who in turn hold equity of these firms, have seats on the supervisory boards, 4 and exert a lot of influence through proxy votes in the shareholders' meeting. 5 We chose ownership to measure the degree of relationship between a bank and a firm for two reasons. First it is well defined and it is possible to collect a consistent data set and second, because it is a conservative measure. A 4 The "Aufsichtsrat" of German firms consists of representatives of the firm owners and the employees and is appointed by the shareholder meeting, see Becht and Boehmer (1999) for an excellent survey on the institutional features of the German governance system.
5 See e.g. Franks and Mayer (2000) for a detailed analysis.
higher equity stake will imply a higher portion of votes in the firm's shareholder meetings and a higher number of seats on the management board. The actual ownership in a company also often underestimates the actual direct control rights, that a bank has on a firm. The classical, pyramid type governance structure in corporate Germany allows banks to control companies even with holding a small equity stake. For example a bank may hold 51% of company A, which in turn holds 51% of company B. The bank then controls B but only holds 26% of B's equity. Thus if we find that the actual equity ownership has a significant influence on the analysts' behavior we will expect more of that bias to be there in the economy.
We define an analyst being adjunct to a firm as an analyst whose broker firm owns a significant stake in that firm. To capture the effect of substantial ownership, we discriminate between large equity stakes (25% or above) and small equity stakes (below 25%). A stakeholder of more than 25% has significant influence under German corporate law as he may e.g. block a merger or liquidation, inhibit the dismissal of members of the supervisory board, prevent the issuance of new shares, or hold back any changes in the firms charter.
If the Chinese Walls are leak we can test for influences in two directions. First the analyst might be pressured to issue biased reports in order not to jeopardize the banks client relationships or lower the value of the bank's equity stake, and second the analyst may benefit from insider information and publish more accurate estimates of future firm performance. Therefore we test, if the reports of adjunct analysts contain a bias relative to the analysts in the control group as well as for the precision of the analyst's estimates. Finally, as we will explain in more detail in section IV, we also test, whether an individual analyst's forecast contains superior information relative to the consensus estimate, i.e. it is an improvement relative to the consensus.
When there is support for the "Conflict of interest hypothesis", we will find adjunct analyst forecasts to be upward biased. With respect to the consensus forecasts, we should find adjunct analysts to report their information mainly in those situations, where the consensus underestimates actual earnings per share. Table I summarizes these main hypothesis. As a refinement we will distinguish, whether the conflict of interest arises because of client pressure or stems from the bank's self interest. The amount of influence, that firms have on the bank will depend on the fraction of equity owned by the bank. When banks are the dominant shareholders, the management can not credibly threaten the bank. The only reason to publish overoptimistic reports is to increase the value of the bank's equity stake. When the bank does not have a dominant share in the company, the firms' management will be more independent and optimistic reports are more likely to be published to maintain a beneficial bank-client relationship. We will therefore also test, whether analysts of banks with large stakes behave differently than their colleagues of banks with minor stakes.
If adjunct brokers have superior information, we will expect their forecasts to be more precise than the reports from rival banks' analysts, whereas the bias should not necessarily differ from the control group. 6 Informed analysts will generally improve the consensus forecast.
That is, if the consensus currently overestimates earnings, we expect the informed broker to issue a relatively lower estimate, whereas an underestimating consensus will be pushed upwards. We refer to this theory as the "Superior information hypothesis".
III. Data
We examine the period from 1994 to 1999. The data needed for our analysis consists of two building blocks: ownership data and analyst forecasts. We collect data of equity stakes in publicly traded German companies for nine large German banks known to be actively involved in both strategic stock investments and analyst forecast activities. These banks are Bay- While it is clear to identify the sample of forecasts from adjunct analysts, there are several possibilities to identify the correct control sample. One possibility would be to use all forecasts where such an ownership relation does not exist. However, this would lead to an extremely unbalanced sample. Therefore, forecasts of adjunct analysts will be compared with two control groups of forecasts.
First, a comparison can be made with forecasts for the same set of firms issued by nonadjunct brokers. To construct this sample, we select all companies where at least one of the five above mentioned banks has an equity stake. For these firms, we use forecasts from all brokers that do not have an equity stake as control for the adjunct analysts. The sample that includes this comparison group will be referred to as all banks sample. This first sample could suffer from a bias if the nine brokers for which we have collected ownership in firms exhibit some kind of specialness.
Second, a relevant comparison group are forecasts of banks for companies where they do not own equity stakes. Therefore, we select a second sample including all forecasts by the nine banks for all German companies. If forecasts are to be found different for corporations where the analysts' houses own equity stakes, this can not be only due to the special nature of the banks making the forecasts, as only forecasts by these banks are used as a control group.
This dataset will be referred to as all firms sample. This sample could suffer from a bias if the companies where bank equity investment exists have special characteristics which e.g.
make it harder to issue correct forecasts. Implementing the analyses for both samples will be sufficient to distinguish whether any results might be driven by a sample selection bias. Figure   1 illustrates the composition of the samples.
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We have followed the procedure described below to construct the datasets used for empirical analysis. For the all banks sample, we use all forecasts from the I/B/E/S data which have been made for the group of German companies where one of the nine banks mentioned above owns an equity stake and issues at least one forecast. We restrict the sample to annual earnings per share forecasts made for the years from 1994 to 1999. We then drop all observations where actual earnings per share are not available. We furthermore eliminate all observations concerning forecasts made later than three months after and earlier than three years before the forecast period end date. We also purge the dataset from observations where the forecast EPS is lower than -1000 Euro, and where the currency is neither DEM nor EURO. This leaves us with 32663 observations. For the all firms sample, we use all forecasts for German companies issued by the nine mentioned banks. We then follow the same procedure as for the all banks sample, which leaves us with 36952 observations in the all firms sample.
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Figure 1. Samples Used for Analysis. 
IV. Empirical Analysis
In the literature, there exist several approaches for the correct measurement of the forecast error. As we will see from the summary statistics, the forecast error, measured in percent of the actual value, is a noisy variable. Especially if actual earnings are close to zero, already a small deviation in monetary terms can lead to a huge percentage error. This problem can be solved by using the difference between forecast value and actual value for the forecast error.
This definition, however, would be misleading as pure size effects would influence the results and as the definition is not invariant to stock splits. Another approach would be to scale the forecast error by the stock price. Theoretically this is appealing as size effects as well as huge outliers stemming from earnings close to zero could be avoided. However, the stock price is not independent from earnings and earnings forecasts. The use of historic stock quotes, say 3 years before end of forecast period, brings data problems (availability of price history for young firms, furthermore history of stock splits would be needed); using more recent data brings the risk of endogeneity problems.
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We have therefore decided to use the percent forecast error, defined as
and the absolute percent forecast error
is the individual forecast, and " $ # the actual value.
To be able to assess the quality of individual forecast errors, we need an appropriate benchmark. We therefore calculate the consensus forecast prevailing at time '
as the median of all individual forecasts issued or explicitly confirmed as accurate between the period of three months and two days before ' . 13 We define the percent forecast error of the consensus forecast
) and the absolute percent forecast error of the consensus ( ¢ ¡ ¢ " ¢ £ ) in an analogous way to individual forecast errors.
To limit the problems arising from outliers, we use robust estimation techniques. As the median is less influenced by outliers than the mean, we explain the median forecast error in our regressions. 14 In the context of earnings forecasts the use of the median is not uncommon, and is frequently reported in consensus forecasts. This shows that analysts tend to overestimate earnings, a feature documented for instance by Chopra (1998) . A measure for forecast variability is the median absolute forecast error, which equals 22 percent. The median time difference between a forecast and the forecast period end date is 0.88 years (which is 320 days). 5.1 percent of forecasts are made by a broker who owns a small equity stake, and additional 0.8 percent of forecasts are made by brokers who own equity stakes larger than 25 percent. The median size of a broker is 37.8 percent, where size of broker is defined as the percentage of German firms covered by a particular broker to the total number of German firms in the I/B/E/S international database in a specific year. The median coverage is 57.1 percent, where coverage is the percentage of brokers in the I/B/E/S international database that issue at least one forecast for a specific firm in a year, within all brokers that issue at least one forecast for at least one German firm. The summary statistics for these variables in the second panel, referring to the all firms sample, are very similar. The median forecast EPS is 1.69 Euro, the median actual EPS 1.16 Euro. The forecast error is considerably higher, with a median of 24 percent. Approximately 5 percent of forecasts are made by adjunct brokers. The median size of brokers is larger (46 percent), in line with the sample selection strategy of investigating forecasts by the nine large German banks mentioned. The median coverage of the firms in this sample is lower, due to the larger number of firms (and therefore inclusion of smaller companies) compared to the all banks sample. 
A. Summary Statistics

Summary Statistics
Forecast and actual earnings per share (EPS) are given in Euro. The forecast error and the absolute forecast error are stated in percent. Time difference, measured in years, is the difference between the date when a forecast is made and the last day of the period for which the forecast is made (period end date). Small stake dummy is one if a broker owns a stake less than 25 percent in the company for which the forecast is made and zero otherwise. Similarly, the large stake dummy is one when a broker owns a stake of at least 25 percent in the company whose EPS are forecast. Size of broker is the number of German companies in the I/B/E/S database covered by a broker divided by the total number of German companies in the database, calculated annually. Coverage is the number of brokers issuing forecasts for a company divided by the total number of brokers issuing forecasts for German companies. Coverage is calculated for each year in the sample.
All Banks Sample. ( Table III compares the median number of forecasts issued by adjunct and non-adjunct brokers.
B. Intensity of Forecast Activity
The first number in each row of the table is the median number of forecasts per broker for a given company over the respective horizon. The second number in parentheses is the number of independent observations used for calculation of these medians. From both samples can be seen, that the number of forecasts issued by a broker is increasing with the forecast horizon. As longer intervals are chosen for more long term forecasts, this is not surprising. However, it can be seen that adjunct analysts issue forecasts more frequently than their non-adjunct colleagues.
This can clearly be seen in both subsamples for all horizons in the case of adjunct brokers with small equity stakes up to 25 percent. While non-adjunct brokers issue a median number of 3 short term, 6 medium term and 7 long term forecasts, adjunct brokers with small stakes issue 4 short term, 7 medium term and 9 long term forecasts. Brokers with very large equity stakes seem more reluctant to issue frequent short term forecasts. The median number of forecasts in the all firms control sample is 2 short term, 7 medium term and 12 long term forecasts.
These numbers show that adjunct brokers are slightly more active in issuing forecasts than independent ones; but the difference is not huge.
C. Explaining the Forecast Error
To see whether there is any systematic difference of forecasts of adjunct brokers to the control group, we report the forecast error within a grid of forecast horizon and size of the equity stake. Table IV reports the median forecast error for short term, medium term and long term forecasts, distinguishing between large, small and no equity stake. We can see that the forecast error increases quickly with the forecast horizon for all groups of brokers. The median forecast error for long term forecasts is approximately 50 percent for adjunct brokers owning large stakes and -5 percent for adjunct brokers owning small stakes. In the all banks control group the median error is near 5 percent, in the all firms sample approximately 44 percent. While the 
extent of the error is smaller for shorter horizons, the general picture is similar. This first comparison shows important differences between the various groups. However, interpretation has to be cautious due to two main reasons. First, the sample of firms for which forecasts are made is different for every row in table IV. Comparisons between rows are therefore problematic.
To avoid that the analysis is driven by market optimism for a specific set of firms, we need to know the forecasts of adjunct brokers relative to the market opinion. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis, we will explain the precision and possible bias of individual forecasts relative to the consensus forecast prevailing at the time when an individual forecast has been made.
The consensus reflects the public available information at the time prior to the forecast and therefore allows us to evaluate conditional biases or precision measures. Second, any univariate analysis neglects the influence of potentially important explanatory variables. Therefore, we will now turn to a multivariate analysis to further explore the relationship between the forecast error and the explanatory variables. 
As the inspection of the summary statistics indicated, many variables are skewed (the mean is large off the median) and the data include numerous extreme realizations. To reduce the impact of these outliers, we explain the median forecast error, conditional on a number of explanatory variables. This median regression is a special case of quantile regression, where the 50 percent quantile is explained. The estimator is also called LAD (least absolute deviation), as it minimizes the sum of absolute residuals from the estimated values.
The choice of the specification can be explained as follows. First, we want to explain the potential bias in forecasts made by adjunct brokers. Therefore, we explain the individual forecast error by the error of the consensus forecast ( for small and large stakes respectively). We calculate the consensus forecast prevailing at the time of an individual forecast as the median of all forecasts issued for the same firm and period within a time window of three months and three days before the individual brokers's forecast.
We run this regression in the all banks sample to see whether for the same firms, forecasts by adjunct brokers are systematically different. We also run this regression setup in the all firms sample to see whether the same brokers behave differently for firms in which they have a significant equity stake than for non-related firms. To test the second hypotheses related to an information advantage, we run similar regressions to explain the absolute forecast error. Table V reports the median regression results. Not surprisingly, the error of the prevailing consensus forecast is an important factor influencing the error of individual forecasts, receiving a weight of 92.5 percent of the estimate of individual forecast errors. Although time effects are already partially incorporated in the consensus forecast error included as a regressor, the time difference between the issue date of an individual forecast and the company's fiscal period end date is highly significant. Individual forecast errors are higher relative to the consensus for longer forecast horizons. Note that the focus of these regressions is on the bias of forecasts respectively their optimism / pessimism relative to the consensus. Higher errors do not necessarily mean less precise estimates, as the consensus could also underestimate actual earnings. However, in most cases the consensus already overestimates, and a higher forecast relative to the consensus would then also translate into a less precise forecast. More intense coverage of a firm reduces the median individual forecast error. The forecast errors of large brokers are smaller than those of their smaller competitors. This is consistent with previous studies, e.g. Lim (2001) . Of interest for our main hypothesis, the coefficients on the adjunct broker dummies are positive. Brokers with a small stake in a firm issue forecasts with a 0.85 percentage points higher forecast error relative to the consensus forecast than their independent colleagues. Their views on earnings are more optimistic in an economically and statistically significant way. The coefficient on brokers with large stakes is positive, but not statistically significant.
The results from the all banks sample can not in all respects be confirmed by the all firms sample. Here, larger brokers (out of the reduced number of brokers in this sample) exhibit higher forecast errors, and the coefficients of the adjunct broker dummies have both negative sign, although not statistically significantly different from zero. The sample selection in the all firms sample allows to tell whether the same brokers behave in a different way for firms where they own equity stakes and others where they do not. However, the regression is not conclusive on this issue.
Together, the results of these regressions only weakly support the conflict of interest hypothesis. The conflict of interest seems to stem from client pressure rather than self interest, as significant effects are only found for analyst houses owning small stakes.
To analyze the superior information hypothesis, we want to explain the absolute forecast
by the following regression:
where
is the percentage absolute forecast error of the consensus forecast. The results are presented in Table VI .
Here, supporting evidence is strong for both samples. Again, the absolute error of the consensus forecast plays a decisive role in explaining the magnitude of individual absolute forecast errors. The longer the time horizon, the less exact forecasts are. The coefficients This regression explains the percent forecast error of individual brokers' forecasts. Regressors are the error of the consensus forecast, the time difference in years between the day of the forecast and the forecast period end date, the coverage of the firm by brokers in I/B/E/S, the size of the broker forecasting measured as market share, and dummy variables that take the value of one if the broker forecasting owns a small (up to 25 %) respectively large (more than 25 %) equity stake in the company whose earnings per share are to be forecast. This regression explains the percent absolute forecast error of individual brokers' forecasts. Regressors are the absolute error of the consensus forecast, the time difference in years between the day of the forecast and the forecast period end date, the coverage of the firm by brokers in I/B/E/S, the size of the broker forecasting measured as market share, and dummy variables that take the value of one if the broker forecasting owns a small (up to 25 %) respectively large (more than 25 %) equity stake in the company whose earnings per share are to be forecast. to explain higher precision in the all firms sample, the coefficient is close to zero in the all banks sample. Note however, that fewer firms are included in the all banks sample and all of these are partly owned by a big German bank. It seems that in this case, the number of brokers following the firm does not proxy for the degree of information available to the universe of brokers. Valid for both samples, larger brokers are able to achieve higher precision than smaller ones. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that adjunct brokers possess superior information, as they issue more precise forecasts relative to the consensus than nonadjunct brokers. The magnitude of the difference is statistically and economically significant only for adjunct brokers with small equity stakes. In the all banks sample, the relative advantage of adjunct brokers with small stakes results in a absolute forecast errors 1.3 percentage points lower relative to the consensus, compared to non-adjunct brokers. In the all firms sample, the information advantage of adjunct brokers with small stakes results in a 2.3 percentage points lower forecast error. For adjunct brokers with large stakes, the effect is smaller and statistically not different from zero. Together, the regressions give support to the information advantage hypothesis. The fact that adjunct brokers with large stakes do not seem to have an information advantage could also be due to the smaller number of datapoints for this type of broker, making inference noisier. Alternatively, as ownership data is publicly available, these brokers might be cautious to release inside information too early to the public to avoid adverse reputation effects.
The evidence obtained by the regressions on the error and absolute error of earnings forecasts is clearly consistent with the superior information hypothesis: Forecasts made by adjunct brokers, in particular by those with relatively small stakes, are in general more precise than those made by the average analyst. The evidence is less obvious on conflict of interest issues.
While there is weak support for the client pressure hypothesis, the self interest hypothesis can not be confirmed.
These results seem to indicate that there are leakages in Chinese Walls. Adjunct brokers face a tradeoff from using this information. Giving their superior knowledge to their customers in form of better EPS forecasts could result in a comparative advantage in this segment of universal banking. However, there might also arise costs from negative effects on business relationships. To explore whether adjunct analysts tend to publish or retain information in particular situations respectively, we now try to explore the information content of new forecasts.
D. Strategic Behavior
If adjunct brokers possess superior information, they have still to decide whether to use their information advantage or not. Analysts working for these brokerage houses will then have conflicting interests. First, for reputation, remuneration and carreer concerns they will try to issue as precise forecasts as possible. In particular, they should avoid issuing wrong forecasts.
Second, they might have to bend under interests of the bank which in many cases could mean issuing optimistic forecasts. A possible way out of this conflict could be to report their superior information to the public only if the consensus appears to be too pessimistic. This behavior could reconcile the interests of having average forecasts with higher precision, while still more optimistic than forecasts of their independent competitors.
We divide therefore the sample into two supsamples: A first subsample, where the forecast error of the consensus estimate ¢ ¡ ¢ " ¢ £ £ , i.e. the consensus overestimates actual EPS, and a second subsample where the consensus strictly underestimates EPS (
) . We then run regressions based on equation 3 for both subsamples.
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The findings presented in Table VII support the hypothesis of strategic behavior. While adjunct brokers with small stakes appear to possess superior information, they do not always Table VII Median Regression Explaining Strategic Behavior.
This regression explains the percent absolute forecast error of individual brokers' forecasts. The sample is split into two subsamples, according to the sign of the forecast error of the consensus estimate, where a zero error is assigned to the positive subsample. Regressors are the absolute error of the consensus forecast, the time difference in years between the day of the forecast and the forecast period end date, the coverage of the firm by brokers in I/B/E/S, the size of the broker forecasting measured as market share, and dummy variables that take the value of one if the broker forecasting owns a small (up to 25 %) respectively large (more than 25 %) equity stake in the company whose earnings per share are to be forecast.
All Banks Sample. 
V. Robustness Checks
We check our results for robustness along three lines. First, we investigate the effect of inclusion of firm characteristics in the regression on our results. Second, we use alternative definitions for the bias relative to the consensus and for the precision of estimates. In addition,
we then use a different methodology for our regressions. Third, we investigate stock market reactions to EPS forecasts. All robustness checks are undertaken for the all banks sample only, as it was only possible to obtain data on company characteristics for this subsample. 16 In the all banks sample, these percentages are 6.3 and 4.1 respectively.
A. Firm Characteristics
Numerous studies have found that the precision of analyst forecasts is related to company fundamentals. However, it is not obvious why public available company data should influence the relative bias or the relative precision of individual forecasts relative to a consensus forecast. To check our empirical results for robustness, we have rerun the median regressions on forecast errors and absolute forecast errors including company specific data frequently used in studies of analyst forecast quality. We have chosen two variables potentially reflecting the degree of uncertainty over a firm's earnings. First, total assets, because it is likely that there is more information available over large firms. Second, the book-to-market ratio. High book-tomarket ratios mean that the market places low growth expectations into a firm, rather relying on real assets and current earnings than growth options to value a firm. It should be easier to forecast earnings for this type of firms. As forecasts are forward looking (with a median of approximately 10 months), we have decided to use 2 years lagged values to reduce any possible feedback effects. We obtain the data for these variables from the Global Vantage database.
As these additional variables do not alter the interpretation of the above results, we only report the median regression on the absolute forecast error for brevity. Note that the sample size is slightly reduced relative to the regressions omitting these additional control variables. This is due to some missing balance sheet data. The augmented regression confirm the more parsimonious specification. The coefficient on size is significant, meaning that indeed absolute forecast errors for larger firms are smaller. The coefficient of the book-to-market ratio is statistically not different from zero. The coefficient of the small stake dummy is very close to the specification before: adjunct brokers make more precise forecasts. While the coefficient of the large stake dummy has changed the sign, it is still statistically not different from zero. This regression explains the percent absolute forecast error of individual brokers' forecasts. Regressors are the absolute error of the consensus forecast, the time difference in year between the day of the forecast and the forecast period end date, the coverage of the firm by brokers in I/B/E/S, the size of the broker forecasting measured as market share, and dummy variables that take the value of one if the broker forecasting owns a significant small (up to 25 %) respectively large (more than 25 %) equity stake in the company whose earnings per share are to be forecast. Total assets are two-years lagged values in million Euro. Book-to-market are two years lagged values of the book-to-market ratio. 
B. Alternative Error Definition and Regression Methodology
In Section IV we have defined the error and absolute error of forecasts relative to ex post realized values. This approach has -among others -the advantages of straightforward interpretation, avoidance of scaling effects due to stock splits, and comparability with the literature.
The main drawback is the large number of outliers, requiring the use of robust estimation techniques. However, when thinking about the bias of an analysts' forecasts relative to other analysts, one might ask the question "How many standard deviations is this forecast away from the consensus?" To formalize this approach, let us define the innovation as deviation from the consensus, measured in standard deviations, as Using the all banks sample, we first explore whether these innovations differ systematically among brokers. We therefore run a regression on the variable innovation. Here, we exclude all observations leading to an absolute innovation larger than 4, which allows us to proceed with OLS regression. The results IX indicate again, that adjunct brokers with small stakes tend to make more optimistic forecasts in a statistically significant way.
As in the previous analysis, we split the sample into subsamples along the consensus overor underestimating actual EPS. Also by this methdology we find that forecasts of adjunct 
C. Stock Market Reaction
If adjunct brokers indeed behave differently when expressing views on companies, efficient stock markets should factor any potential bias out. We test whether the stock markets reacts in a different way to forecasts by independent and adjunct brokers by regressing 11 day cumulative returns on the innovation measure calculated for each forecast. 18 We distinguish among the different types of brokers.
The results indicate that stock markets generally do not react to earnings per share forecasts that are more positive than the median of existing forecasts. However, stock markets do significantly react to pessimistic forecasts. The point estimates suggest that the market reaction is more severe for adjunct brokers. While a forecast that is one standard deviation below the consensus reduces the stock price by approximately half a percent if this pessimistic forecast originates from an independent analyst, the stock price depresses by one percent for adjunct analysts with small stakes and by 2.7 percent for adjunct analysts with large stakes.
The market seems to take the view that the situation is really bad if even adjunct brokers are pessimistic. The finding that pessimistic forecasts are more credible if made by adjunct brokers is consistent with both the information advantage and the conflict of interest hypotheses. 17 We have omitted the supplementary regressions and a more detailed analysis for brevity. To check for robustness of the analysis of the precision of forecasts, we have also analysed the measure
by ordinary regression. Again, the results lead to the same interpretation as the analysis in Section IV. The omitted Tables are available from the authors by request. 18 We report cumulative returns. We also analyze cumulative excess returns. This does not change our conclusions. Table X Regression Estimates Explaining Market Reaction to Forecasts.
Least squares regression explaining market reactions to forecasts. Dependent variable is the 11-day cumulative stock price return centered around the day of the forecast. Innovation is the difference between the new forecast and the consensus forecast prevailing at the time of the forecast, scaled by the standard deviation of the difference between individual forecasts and consensus forecasts in the time interval three months prior to the forecast date. Innovation -independent equals the innovation for all forecasts made by independent brokers and zero otherwise. Innovation -small stakes equals the innovation of the forecast for adjunct brokers with small stakes and zero otherwise. Innovation -large stakes equals the innovation of the forecast for adjunct brokers with large stakes and zero otherwise. The sample is split along the cases of positive (first panel) and negative (second panel) innovations. Observations where the innovations is larger in absolute terms than 4 (standard deviations) are excluded. 
VI. Conclusion
We have examined the existence of spill overs of superior information and possible conflicts of interests within universal banks in the specific setting of analyst forecasts of earnings per share. While there are so-called Chinese Walls in place in universal banks, which should prevent both types of influence on analysts to occur, we find evidence for leakages through which both superior information and pressure on analysts find their way to research departments. The relationship between banks and their corporate customers in Germany is often best described by the term of a housebank relationship. Frequently, these housebanks even dominate corporations in shareholder meetings through large equity stakes and additional proxy votes from small shareholders. According to the size of the stake in a company, and whether the total investment has rather characteristics of a loan or a stock portfolio, we expect bank behavior to be different. For the purpose of our analysis, we distinguish therefore between small and large equity stakes. Our findings give support to both the superior information hypothesis and the conflict of interest hypothesis. According to our results, there is evidence for an information advantage of banks owning equity stakes, regardless of the size of the equity stake. This superior information is flowing at least partly to analysts in research departments despite of
Chinese Walls. This is demonstrated by evidence that the conditional median absolute forecast error is smaller for adjunct brokers. Furthermore, both brokers owning small and large stakes are better able than their independent colleagues to make earnings per share forecasts that are an improvement relative to the consensus estimate. Second, we also find support for the conflict of interest hypothesis, demonstrated by asymmetries of analyst behavior with respect to the consensus forecast over-oder underestimating actual earnings per share. Adjunct brokers with small equity stakes are relatively more likely to announce forecasts that are an improvement to the consensus if the consensus underestimates actual earnings. This finding suggests that the conflict of interest originates rather from client pressure than the banks self interest.
Consistent with the literature on conflict of interest in the investment banking industry, clients who have established business relationships with other departments of the bank are unlikely to have to suffer from unfavorable forecasts.
